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Supporting Pluralism by Artificial Intelligence:
Conceptualizing Epistemic Disagreements as
Digital Artifacts
Soheil Human, Golnaz Bidabadi, and Vadim Savenkov
Abstract A crucial concept in philosophy and social sciences, epistemic
disagreement, has not yet been adequately reflected in the Web. In this paper, we
call for development of intelligent tools dealing with epistemic disagreements on
the Web to support pluralism. As a first step, we present POLYPHONY, an ontology
for representing and annotating epistemic disagreements.
1 Introduction
While artificial intelligence is considered as both threat and opportunity for the
modern democracies, many have called for immediate action for development of
AI tools to support pluralism (see e.g. Helbing et al, 2017). Detection,
representation and visualization of epistemic disagreements, we propose, is one of
the important steps to support pluralism and dialog in the Web. Here are two
concrete examples: (I) consider a controversial article in Wikipedia that is the
matter of different disagreements. If we would be able to detect and represent
disagreements, disputable parts could be visualized for people, users could simply
compare different points of view (or request particular versions of the article based
on their preferences). (II) Imagine you have recently read an article and like to find
some articles that disagree with the proposed point of view. If it would be possible
to automatically identify and link disagreeing articles, one could simply find them
without the need to exploring all related articles one by one and thoroughly to
discover disagreeing contents.
Soheil Human
Department of Philosophy & Cognitive Science Research Platform, University of Vienna,
Universitätsring 1, A-1010 Vienna, Austria, e-mail: soheil.human@univie.ac.at
Department of Information Systems & Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business,
Welthandelsplatz 1, A-1020 Vienna, Austria, e-mail: soheil.human@wu.ac.at
Golnaz Bidabadi
Cisco Systems, Inc., 170 West Tasman Drive, San Jose, CA 95134, United States, e-mail:
golnaz@cisco.com
Vadim Savenkov
Department of Information Systems & Operations, Vienna University of Economics and Business,
Welthandelsplatz 1, A-1020 Vienna, Austria, e-mail: vadim.savenkov@wu.ac.at
1
2 Soheil Human, Golnaz Bidabadi, and Vadim Savenkov
Due to its nature, Semantic Web and Linked [Open] Data are perfectly fit to
capture disagreements: producing two different descriptions of the same
phenomenon and publishing them suffices to produce a potential disagreement.
What remains to be done is making the disagreement between descriptions
co-existing, e.g., at different sources, explicit. This paper advocates a particular
instance of the general Linked Open Data (LOD) principle, according to which
explicit links between entities and resources are essential. The special type of link,
we advocate in this paper, is explicit disagreement annotations, making explicit the
disagreements using standard LOD linking by means of IRIs. We call the design
pattern of providing several alternative descriptions of the same subject its pluralist
description. This pattern requires either (a) authors of description to be aware of
alternative views on the subject, and taking care of encoding these alternative
descriptions, or (b) the disagreeing contents are detected, linked and visualized by
artificial intelligent agents. Considering the huge and increasing amount of
available data, the former option seems to be unrealistic, leaving us no choice but
to develop intelligent tools that can perform such tasks. Here, we take the first step
towards development of intelligent tools dealing with epistemic disagreements on
the Web by conceptualizing epistemic disagreements as digital artifacts and
proposing an ontology for representing epistemic disagreements, called
POLYPHONY.
2 Conceptualizing Epistemic Disagreements as Digital Artifacts
Study of epistemic disagreements is a fresh and active field of research (Goldman,
2010; Frances, 2014, p.16). Besides the very fundamental questions regarding
existence and importance of disagreements, many epistemologists have tried to
answer two main questions: (1) What types of disagreement exist? (2) What is the
rational response to each type? In order to conceptualize epistemic disagreements
as digital artifacts, the answers to the these questions should be considered.
Therefore, after a literature review, some of the most important types of epistemic
disagreements, such as peer disagreements, deep disagreements, genuine
disagreements, merely apparent disagreements, merely verbal disagreements, and
faultless disagreements (Siegal, 2013; Fogelin, 1985; Cohnitz and Marques, 2014;
Jenkins, 2014), along with binary distinctions between them were identified, and
real-world examples of each type were documented. Next, possible responses to
disagreements, such as (a) rejecting the existence of the disagreement,
(b) maintaining one’s confidence, (c) suspending judgment, (d) reducing one’s
confidence, and (e) deferring to the other’s conclusion and the relationship between
these responses and different types of epistemic disagreements based on the
real-world examples were identified and documented1.
1 See the documentations of the POLYPHONY ontology for detailed descriptions, here:
http://purl.org/epistemic-disagreement.
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Fig. 1 Core concepts of POLYPHONY 1
Based on the conceptualization of epistemic disagreements outlined before, we
designed, POLYPHONY (see Fig. 1) a generic OWL ontology for annotating
disagreements in Linked Data. To this end, POLYPHONY supports disagreement
annotations of varying granularity: from the ontology level to the level of single
triple, or a collection of triples. As a proof of concept, POLYPHONY was applied to
OPENEED, a modular ontology for human needs data proposed by Human et al
(2017), to represent disagreements between different modules of the OPENEED
ontology, i.e. to annotate epistemic disagreements between needs theories.
Conclusion — Epistemic disagreement has been argued to be valuable for most
crucial aspects of society, such as science (Cruz and Smedt, 2013) and politics. In
this paper, we took the first step towards development of intelligent tools dealing
with epistemic disagreements on the Web by presenting POLYPHONY, an ontology
for representing epistemic disagreements. We hope that our research will serve as a
base for future studies on development of intelligence tools for automatic detection,
annotation, and visualization of epistemic disagreements on the Web.
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